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Three-party quantum private comparison of equality
based on genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit
states
Cai Zhang · Zhiwei Sun · Xiang Huang ·
Dongyang Long
Abstract We propose a new three-party quantum private comparison pro-
tocol using genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit states. In our protocol,
three participants can determine whether their private information are equal
or not without an external third party who helps compute the comparison
result. At the same time the participants can preserve the privacy of their
inputs, respectively. Our protocol does not need any unitary operations to
encode information due to the excellent properties of genuinely maximally
entangled six-qubit states. Additionally, the protocol uses one-step quantum
transmission and it is congenitally free from Trojan horse attacks. We have
also shown that our protocol is secure against outside and participant attacks
in this paper.
Keywords Three-party quantum private comparison · Genuinely maximally
entangled six-qubit state · Trojan horse attack
1 Introduction
The first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol was proposed by Ben-
nett and Brassard[1] in 1984. After that, an increasing number of quantum
cryptographic protocols such as quantum secret sharing (QSS) [2,3,4,5,6,7,8],
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [9,10,11,12,13,14,15], quan-
tum key agreement (QKA) [16,17,18,19], quantum summation [20,21,22,23,
24] and quantum private comparison (QPC) [25,26,27] have been presented.
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Quantum private comparison, as a subfield of quantum cryptography, has at-
tracted more and more researchers. The aim of QPCs is to compare the partic-
ipants’ private information without publicly revealing their respective private
information.
Since Yao [28] presented a protocol for the millionaires’ problem in which
the participants try to determine which one is richer without revealing their ac-
tual wealth, the protocols of private comparison have widely been investigated.
Boudot et al. [29] proposed a protocol to decide whether two millionaires are
equally rich or not. But Lo [30] showed that the equality function cannot be
securely evaluated in a two-party scenario. Thus, some additional assumptions
such as a semi-honest third party are required to achieve the goal of private
comparison.
Yang et al. [25] proposed the first quantum private comparison protocol
in which the entanglement of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and the
one-way hash function are employed. Chen et al. [26] presented an efficient
protocol of equality using triplet states. Ref.[27] gave a more efficient quantum
private comparison of equality protocol without the entanglement of EPR
pairs. Liu et al. [31,32,33,34] presented QPC protocols employing the triplet
W states, χ-type genuine four-particle entangled states and the Bell states.
Huang et al. [35] designed a quantum private comparison of equality protocol
with collective detection-noise channels. Liu et al. [36] employed single photons
and collective detection to devise an efficient quantum private comparison
protocol. Zhang et al. [37] proposed a quantum private comparison protocol
based on an quantum search algorithm. Li et al. [38] presented an efficient
protocol for equal information comparison based on four-particle entangled
W state and Bell entangled states swapping. All the above protocol works
for two-party who wish to compare their private information. Recently, some
multi-user quantum private comparison protocols were presented. Chang et
al. [39] gave a multi-user private comparison protocol using GHZ class states.
Liu et al. [40] presented a multi-party quantum private comparison protocol
using d-dimensional basis states without entanglement swapping.
All the above protocols include a third party who helps participants com-
pute comparison results. Lin et al. [41] used EPR pairs and a one-way hash
function to design a quantum private comparison of equality protocol without
a third party that works for the two-party scenario. If the number of par-
ticipants exceeds 2, can one find a protocol for quantum private comparison
without an external third party who helps compute the comparison result? We
find such a protocol for three-party quantum private comparison. The proto-
col is based on genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit states (we name it
BPB state). In our protocol, three participants can determine whether their
private information are equal without the external third party, and meanwhile
preserve the privacy of their inputs, respectively. Any unitary operations are
not required to encode information due to the excellent properties of genuinely
maximally entangled six-qubit states. Furthermore, the protocol employs one-
step quantum transmission, hence it will not suffer Trojan horse attacks. Our
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protocol is also proven to be secure against various attacks including outside
and participant attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze
the structure of the genuinely maximally BPB state and show the excellent
properties which are useful for designing our protocol. In Section 3, we pro-
pose a protocol of quantum private comparison based on genuinely maximally
BPB states. In Section 4, we analyze the correctness and the security of the
presented protocol. Finally, we make a conclusion in Section 5.
2 The genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit state
Quantum entanglement, as a physical resource, plays a key role in many appli-
cations such as quantum teleportation [42], quantum dense coding [43], quan-
tum key distribution [44], quantum secret sharing [45] and quantum secure
direct communication [14,15].
By using a numeric searching program, Borras et al. [46] found the gen-
uinely maximally BPB state, which is
1√
32
[(|000000〉 + |111111〉+ |000011〉+ |111100〉
+ |000101〉+ |111010〉+ |000110〉+ |111001〉
+ |001001〉+ |110110〉+ |001111〉+ |110000〉
+ |010001〉+ |101110〉+ |010010〉+ |101101〉
+ |011000〉+ |100111〉+ |011101〉+ |100010〉)
− (|010100〉+ |101011〉+ |010111〉+ |101000〉
+ |011011〉+ |100100〉+ |001010〉+ |110101〉
+ |001100〉+ |110011〉+ |011110〉+ |100001〉)]123456. (1)
We denote this six-qubit state by Ψ6qb. From the above formula, we can see
that Ψ6qb includes 32 terms, each of which has even |0〉 and equal coefficient.
To show the engtangled property of Ψ6qb, we can rewrite it as
Ψ6qb =
1√
8
[|000〉|γ11〉 + |001〉|γ12〉+ |010〉|γ13〉+ |011〉|γ14〉
− |100〉|γ15〉 − |101〉|γ16〉+ |110〉|γ17〉
+ |111〉|γ18〉]123456, (2)
where {|γ1j 〉|j = 1, 2, . . . , 8} forms an orthogonal basis on Hilbert space C2 ⊗
C2 ⊗ C2 such that
|γ11〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Φ+〉+ |1〉|Ψ+〉), |γ12〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Ψ−〉 − |1〉|Φ−〉),
|γ13〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Ψ+〉 − |1〉|Φ+〉), |γ14〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Φ−〉+ |1〉|Ψ−〉),
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|γ15〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Ψ−〉+ |1〉|Φ−〉), |γ16〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Φ+〉 − |1〉|Ψ+〉),
|γ17〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Φ−〉 − |1〉|Ψ−〉), |γ18〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉|Ψ+〉+ |1〉|Φ+〉), (3)
and |Φ±〉 and |Ψ±〉 are Bell states in the form of
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉), (4)
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉), (5)
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉 − | − −〉), (6)
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) = 1√
2
(| −+〉 − |+−〉). (7)
Here, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) are the eigenvectors of the
Pauli operator σX .
We can also rewrite Ψ6qb as
Ψ6qb =
1√
8
[|+++〉|γ21〉 + |++−〉|γ22〉+ |+−+〉|γ23〉+ |+ −−〉|γ24〉
+ | −++〉|γ25〉+ | −+−〉|γ26〉+ | − −+〉|γ27〉
+ | − −−〉|γ28〉]123456, (8)
where {|γ2j 〉|j = 1, 2, . . . , 8} also forms an orthogonal basis on Hilber space
C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ C2 such that
|γ21〉 =
1√
2
(|+〉|Ψ+〉+ |−〉|Φ−〉), |γ22〉 =
1√
2
(−|+〉|Ψ−〉+ |−〉|Φ+〉),
|γ23〉 =
1√
2
(−|+〉|Φ−〉 − |−〉|Ψ+〉), |γ24〉 =
1√
2
(|+〉|Φ+〉 − |−〉|Ψ−〉),
|γ25〉 =
1√
2
(|+〉|Ψ−〉+ |−〉|Φ+〉), |γ26〉 =
1√
2
(|+〉|Ψ+〉 − |−〉|Φ−〉),
|γ27〉 =
1√
2
(|+〉|Φ+〉+ |−〉|Ψ−〉), |γ28〉 =
1√
2
(|+〉|Φ−〉 − |−〉|Ψ+〉), (9)
where |Φ±〉 and |Ψ±〉 are Bell states as Eqs.(4-7) and |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) are the eigenvectors of the Pauli operator σX .
We will use Eq. (2) and Eq. (8) in our protocol to check whether the
participant who distributes the state Ψ6qb is honest or not.
Let us further investigate the properties of the state Ψ6qb.
Ψ6qb =
1
2
(|Φ+〉12|Φ+〉36|Φ+〉45 + |Φ−〉12|Ψ−〉36|Ψ+〉45
+ |Ψ−〉12|Ψ+〉36|Φ−〉45 + |Ψ+〉12|Φ−〉36|Ψ−〉45) (10)
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 5
=
1
2
(−|Φ−〉13|Φ−〉24|Φ+〉56 + |Φ+〉13|Ψ+〉24|Ψ+〉56
− |Ψ+〉13|Ψ−〉24|Φ−〉56 − |Ψ−〉13|Φ+〉24|Ψ−〉56) (11)
=
1
2
(|Φ−〉14|Φ+〉26|Φ−〉35 + |Φ+〉14|Ψ+〉26|Ψ+〉35
+ |Ψ−〉14|Ψ−〉26|Φ+〉35 + |Ψ+〉14|Φ−〉26|Ψ−〉35) (12)
=
1
2
(|Φ+〉15|Φ+〉23|Φ+〉46 + |Φ−〉15|Ψ+〉23|Ψ−〉46
+ |Ψ+〉15|Ψ−〉23|Φ−〉46 + |Ψ−〉15|Φ−〉23|Ψ+〉46) (13)
=
1
2
(|Φ−〉16|Φ+〉25|Φ−〉34 + |Φ+〉16|Ψ−〉25|Ψ−〉34
+ |Ψ+〉16|Ψ+〉25|Φ+〉34 + |Ψ−〉16|Φ−〉25|Ψ+〉34). (14)
From the above Eqs.(10-14), it is obvious to see that the other four qubits
will collapse to the tensor product of two pairs of EPR when any two qubits
of Ψ6qb are measured with the Bell Basis {|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉}. However,
these two-split forms of Ψ6qb are not suitable for our task. We should rewrite
Ψ6qb as
Ψ6qb =
1
4
[|Φ+〉12( |Φ+〉34 |Φ+〉65 + |Φ−〉34|Φ−〉65
+ |Ψ+〉34 |Ψ+〉65 + |Ψ−〉34|Ψ−〉65)
+|Φ−〉12(− |Φ+〉34 |Φ−〉65 + |Φ−〉34|Φ+〉65
− |Ψ+〉34 |Ψ−〉65 + |Ψ−〉34|Ψ+〉65)
+|Ψ+〉12( |Φ+〉34 |Ψ+〉65 + |Φ−〉34|Ψ−〉65
− |Ψ+〉34 |Φ+〉65 − |Ψ−〉34|Φ−〉65)
+|Ψ−〉12(− |Φ+〉34 |Ψ−〉65 + |Φ−〉34|Ψ+〉65
+ |Ψ+〉34 |Φ−〉65 − |Ψ−〉34|Φ+〉65)]. (15)
Let us agree on the following encoding:
|Φ+〉 → 00, |Φ−〉 → 01,
|Ψ+〉 → 10, |Ψ−〉 → 11. (16)
We denote the encoding of x as Encod(x) where x ∈ {|Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉}.
For example, Encod(|Φ−〉) = 01. We can let Encod(x) = Encod(−x) because
the measurement outcome of −x will be x with certainty if it is measured with
Bell basis. Actually, we can say that x and −x are the same up to a global
phase factor −1.
After the above encoding Eq. (16) , the Eq. (15) tells us that if we measure
particles (1, 2) , particles (3, 4) and particles (6, 5) with Bell basis, respectively,
then the responding measurement outcomes R12, R34 and R65 satisfy the
following equation:
Encod(R12)⊕ Encod(R34)⊕ Encod(R65) = 00. (17)
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The Eqs.(15-17) allow us to design a three-party quantum comparison protocol
in which three participants can determine whether their private information
are equal or not without the help of an external third party and keep their
inputs secret, respectively.
3 The three-party quantum private comparison protocol
In our protocol, we assume that the classical and quantum channels are au-
thenticated. Suppose that three participants P1, P2 and P3 have private in-
formation (secret bit strings) M1, M2 and M3, respectively. They wish to
determine whether M1 = M2 = M3 or not and preserve the privacy of their
information, respectively. The length of secret bit string is L. We assume that
the participant P1 prepares the genuinely maximally BPB states Ψ6qb, then
the process of the multi-party quantum private comparison protocol can be
described as follows.
(S1) P1 first prepares (⌈L2 ⌉+ δ) (⌈ ⌉ denotes the ceiling function) genuinely
maximally BPB states Ψ6qb. Then he picks up the particles (3, 4) (parti-
cles (6, 5)) from each Ψ6qb to form an ordered sequence S34 (S65). After
that P1 prepares d decoy particles, each of which is in one of the quantum
states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}. He then randomly inserts the d decoy particles
into the sequence S34 (S65) to form a new sequence S
∗
34 (S
∗
65). Note that
anyone does not know the initial states and positions of the d decoy par-
ticles except P1. At last, P1 transmits S
∗
34 (S
∗
65) to participant P2 (P3)
and keeps the ordered sequence S12 of particles (1, 2) from each Ψ6qb in
his lab.
(S2) Confirming that participant P2 (P3) has received all the particles S
∗
34
(S∗65) sent by P1. P1 announces the positions and the bases of the decoy
particles to P2 (P3). In the following, participant P2 (P3) measures the
decoy particles with one of the two bases {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} ac-
cording to P1’s announced information. And then P2 (P3) publishes his
measurement outcomes. Later, P1 can determine the error rate accord-
ing to the d decoy particles’ initial states. If the error rate exceeds the
threshold, then this protocol will be aborted and repeat the step (S1).
Otherwise, the protocol will go to the next step.
(S3) P2 and P3 collaborate to check whether P1 distributes the intended par-
ticles to them. Namely, P2 (P3) should receive the ordered sequence S34
(S65) of particles (3, 4) (particles (6, 5)). First, P2 (P3) removes the decoy
particles from S∗34 (S
∗
65) to get S34 (S65). They then randomly choose δ
genuinely maximally BPB states Ψ6qb (we call them sample states) for
checking and tell P1 the positions of the sample states. After that they
ask P1 to measure the particles (1, 2) in each sample state with one of the
two bases {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} randomly. If P1 measures the particles
(1, 2) with the basis {|0〉, |1〉} ({|+〉, |−〉}), then P2 measures the particle
3 with the basis {|0〉, |1〉} ({|+〉, |−〉}), and P2 and P3 measure the parti-
cles (4, 5, 6) with the basis {|γ1j 〉|j = 1, 2, . . . , 8} ({|γ2j 〉|j = 1, 2, . . . , 8}).
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Finally, P2 and P3 can determine the error rate of the correlation of their
outcomes according to Eq. (2) and Eq. (8). If the error rate exceeds the
threshold, then this protocol will be aborted and repeat the step (S1).
Otherwise, the protocol will go to the next step.
(S4) By removing the particles of the sample states, P1 (P2, P3) measures
particles (1, 2) (particles (3, 4) , particles (6, 5)) of the ith Ψ6qb (i =
1, 2, . . . , ⌈L
2
⌉) with the Bell basis. According to their measurement out-
comes and the encoding arrangement Eq. (16), P1 (P2, P3) will get the
key K1 (K2, K3) that will be kept secret. For example, the possible mea-
surement outcomes of the ith Ψ6qb may be R
i
12 = |Ψ−〉 (Ri34 = |Ψ+〉,
Ri65 = |Φ−〉), thus the ith two bits of K1 (K2, K3) is 11 (10, 01). After
that P1 (P2, P3) computes C1 = M1⊕K1 (C2 = M2⊕K2, C3 =M3⊕K3)
(Here, ⊕ denotes the addition module 2.).
(S5) P2 (P3) sends C2 (C3) to P1, P1 then can determine whether M2 = M3
or not. If M2 6= M3, P1 announces the result and the protocol finishes.
Otherwise, P1 randomly computes C13 = C1 ⊕ C3 or C12 = C1 ⊕ C2.
If P1 computes C13 = C1 ⊕ C3 (C12 = C1 ⊕ C2), he then sends C13
(C12) to P2 (P3). Subsequently P2 (P3) can determine whether M1 =M3
(M1 = M2) depending on the key K2 (K3) and C13 (C12). Finally, they
can determine whether M1 = M2 = M3 or not and preserve the privacy
of their information, respectively.
4 Analysis of the presented protocol
In this section, we will analyze the correctness and the security of our protocol.
4.1 Correctness
According to the Eq. (17), we can find in the step (S4) that K1⊕K2⊕K3 = 0.
When P1 receives C2 and C3 from P2 and P3, respectively, he could compute
K1 ⊕ C2 ⊕ C3 = K1 ⊕K2 ⊕M2 ⊕K3 ⊕M3
= K1 ⊕K2 ⊕K3 ⊕M2 ⊕M3
= M2 ⊕M3. (18)
Later, he can determine whether M2 ⊕M3 = 0 depending on the Eq. (18). If
he finds that M2 ⊕M3 6= 0, he can simply announce that M1 = M2 = M3 is
false and the protocol finishes. Otherwise, the protocol will continue and P2
(P3) can also determine whether M1 =M3 (M1 = M2) or not in the step (S5)
using the similar method as that of P1. Finally, the protocol could correctly
determine M1 =M2 = M3 or not.
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4.2 Security
Compared with the quantum cryptography protocols such as quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD)[1,47,48,49,50], quantum secret sharing (QSS)[2,3,4,5,6,7,8]
and quantum secure direct communication (QSDC)[9,10,11,12,13,14,15], the
security analysis of multi-party quantum private comparison protocol is more
complicated. Because the attacks from all participants have to be considered
in multi-party quantum private comparison protocols. Outside eavesdroppers
have the desire to get the participants’ private inputs. In addition, some par-
ticipants may do their utmost to derive other participants’ private secret in-
formation. Therefore, multi-party quantum private comparison protocols must
be secure against outside and participant attacks.
4.2.1 Outside attacks
Similar to the detection method for outside eavesdropping used in the BB84
QKD protocol [1], we employ the decoy particles to prevent the eavesdropping.
It has been proven to be unconditionally secure by Ref. [48]. Any outside
eavesdropping will be detected in the step (S2), thus outside Eve’s all kinds of
attacks, such as the intercept-resend attack, the measurement-resend attack,
the entanglement-measurement attack, are useless in our protocol. We take
the intercept-resend attack as an example here: suppose that the initial decoy
particle state is |0〉, and Eve randomly measures it with one of the two bases
{|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉}, and then she sends the fake particle prepared by
herself according to the measurement outcomes to P2 (P3). Obviously, the
probability of being detected during the step (S2) is 1
4
. When we use d decoy
particles for eavesdropping detection, the probability of being detected will be
1−(3
4
)d. We can see that if d is large enough, the probability of being detected
will approach to 1. Therefore, Eve will be detected in the step (S2).
On the other hand, Eve may get the ciphertexts C2, C3, C13 and C12 that
are one-time pad ciphertexts in the protocol. However, she cannot get the keys
K1, K2 or K3 that are kept secret by the participants. Thus, she fails to derive
the participants’ private inputs.
Trojan horse attack [51,52,53], such as the delay-photon Trojan horse at-
tack and the invisible photon eavesdropping (IPE) Trojan horse attack, exists
in two-way quantum communication protocols. Our protocol is congenitally
free from these attacks because the presented protocol employs one-step quan-
tum transmission.
4.2.2 Participant attack: one of the participants wants to steal others’ inputs
First, we can assume that P2 wishes to steal the input of P1 (P3) because the
role of the participant P3 is the same as the participant P2.
In order to do that, he should find out P1’s key K1 and P3’s key K3. How-
ever, he is unable to complete this task. From the Eq. (15) and the encoding
arrangement Eq. (16), he can just have K1 ⊕ K2 ⊕ K3 = 0. P2 is unable to
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 9
Table 1 The relations of the participants’ keys and their measurement outcomes.
P1 P2 P3
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Φ+〉12 (|Φ−〉12) |Φ+〉34 (|Φ+〉34) |Φ+〉65 (|Φ−〉65)
Corresponding keys 00 (01) 00 (00) 00 (01)
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Φ+〉12 (|Φ−〉12) |Φ−〉34 (|Φ−〉34) |Φ−〉65 (|Φ+〉65)
Corresponding keys 00 (01) 01 (01) 01 (00)
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Φ+〉12 (|Φ−〉12) |Ψ+〉34 (|Ψ+〉34) |Ψ+〉65 (|Ψ−〉65)
Corresponding keys 00 (01) 10 (10) 10 (11)
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Φ+〉12 (|Φ−〉12) |Ψ−〉34 (|Ψ−〉34) |Ψ−〉65 (|Ψ+〉65)
Corresponding keys 00 (01) 11 (11) 11 (10)
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Ψ+〉12 (|Ψ−〉12) |Φ+〉34 (|Φ+〉34) |Ψ+〉65 (|Ψ−〉65)
Corresponding keys 10 (11) 00 (00) 10 (11)
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Ψ+〉12 (|Ψ−〉12) |Φ−〉34 (|Φ−〉34) |Ψ−〉65 (|Ψ+〉65)
Corresponding keys 10 (11) 01 (01) 11 (10)
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Ψ+〉12 (|Ψ−〉12) |Ψ+〉34 (|Ψ+〉34) |Φ+〉65 (|Φ−〉65)
Corresponding keys 10 (11) 10 (10) 00 (01)
Possible measurement
outcomes
|Ψ+〉12 (|Ψ−〉12) |Ψ−〉34 (|Ψ−〉34) |Φ−〉65 (|Φ+〉65)
Corresponding keys 10 (11) 11 (11) 01 (00)
exactly figure out the values of K1 and K3. In the step (S5), P2 may get C13
(C12) that’s the ciphertext of M1 ⊕M3 (M1 ⊕M2) encrypted by K2 (K3).
But he cannot obtain C13 and C12 at the same time in our protocol. If P2
gets C12, he could compute C12 ⊕ C2 = C1 = K1 ⊕M1. He could also get C3
and C13, computing C3 ⊕ C13 = K3 ⊕M3 ⊕K1 ⊕M1 ⊕K3 ⊕M3 = K1 ⊕M1
which is the ciphertext of M1 encrypted by K1. Obviously, he cannot have
the P1’s private input M1 because he does not know the exact value of K1.
P2 also fails to get P3’s private input M3 because he cannot get P3’s key K3.
Therefore, P2 couldn’t have the private inputs of P1 and P3. We take the two
bits keys as an example so as to see the relations of the participants’ keys
and their measurement outcomes. The details see Table 1. From this table, we
know that P2 cannot definitely determine the keys of P1 and P3 depending on
his own key.
Second, we will show that our protocol is still secure if P1 wants to steal
others’ inputs. In the proposed protocol, the participant P1 who prepares the
state Ψ6qb is more powerful than P2 and P3. He may prepare some particu-
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lar fake particles, sending them to P2 and P3, respectively. And then he can
determine the keys of P2 and P3 with certainty. Hence he could get the pri-
vate inputs of P2 and P3. For instance, P1 can send particles in the ordered
sequence in Bell state |Ψ−〉 (|Ψ+〉) to P2 (P3) if he wishes to decide some two
bits of P2’s (P3’s) key to be 11 (10). He could also prepare the real state Ψ6qb,
but then sends the particular particles to P2 (P3) according to Eqs.(10-14). He
can finally steal the key of P2 (P3) depending on the relation of their measure-
ment outcomes, obtaining their private inputs. Unfortunately, these attacks
will be detected in the step (S3) of our protocol if δ is large enough. The gen-
eral attack of P1 can be described by a unitary operation: UA performed on
qubits, including the state Ψ6qb and the probe state initialized as |0〉A before
P1 sends the particles to P2 and P3. We can prove that the final state of Ψ6qb
would not be entangled with P1’s probe state, which implies P1 cannot get
any information about exact measurement outcomes of P2 and P3 through his
probe if there is no error to occur. Thus he could not get the keys of P2 and
P3.
The most general operation P1 can do is to entangle the state Ψ6qb with
the probe state initialized as |0〉A, which can be written as
UAΨ6qb|0〉A = 1
4
[|Φ+〉12( |Φ+〉34 |Φ+〉65|A1〉+ |Φ−〉34|Φ−〉65|A2〉
+ |Ψ+〉34 |Ψ+〉65|A3〉+ |Ψ−〉34|Ψ−〉65|A4〉)
+|Φ−〉12(− |Φ+〉34 |Φ−〉65|A5〉|+ |Φ−〉34|Φ+〉65|A6〉
− |Ψ+〉34 |Ψ−〉65|A7〉+ |Ψ−〉34|Ψ+〉65|A8〉)
+|Ψ+〉12( |Φ+〉34 |Ψ+〉65|A9〉+ |Φ−〉34|Ψ−〉65|A10〉
− |Ψ+〉34 |Φ+〉65|A11〉 − |Ψ−〉34|Φ−〉65|A12〉)
+|Ψ−〉12(− |Φ+〉34 |Ψ−〉65|A13〉+ |Φ−〉34|Ψ+〉65|A14〉
+ |Ψ+〉34 |Φ−〉65|A15〉 − |Ψ−〉34|Φ+〉65|A16〉)], (19)
where |Ai〉 (i = 1, 2, . . . , 16) are some unnormalized states in P1’s probe space.
We will prove that that the final state of Ψ6qb would not be entangled with
P1’s probe state if he can escape the detection in the step (S3) of our protocol.
On one hand, if P1 measures the particles (1, 2) with the basis {|0〉, |1〉},
then P2 measures the particle 3 with the basis {|0〉, |1〉}, and P2 and P3 measure
the particles (4, 5, 6) with the basis {|γ1j 〉|j = 1, 2, . . . , 8}. Then, the state in
Eq. (19) can be rewritten as follows:
1√
8
{|000〉[|γ11〉(|A1〉 + |A3〉+ |A6〉+ |A8〉) + |γ14〉(|A2〉 − |A4〉 − |A5〉+ |A7〉)
+|γ16〉(|A1〉 − |A3〉+ |A6〉 − |A8〉) + |γ17〉(|A2〉+ |A4〉 − |A5〉 − |A7〉)]
+|001〉[|γ12〉(|A2〉 + |A4〉+ |A5〉+ |A7〉) + |γ13〉(|A1〉+ |A3〉 − |A6〉 − |A8〉)
+|γ15〉(|A4〉 − |A2〉 − |A5〉+ |A7〉) + |γ18〉(|A1〉+ |A3〉 − |A6〉 − |A8〉)]
+|010〉[|γ13〉(|A10〉 + |A12〉+ |A13〉+ |A15〉) + |γ12〉(|A9〉 − |A11〉 − |A14〉+ |A16〉)
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+|γ15〉(|A9〉 + |A11〉 − |A14〉 − |A16〉) + |γ18〉(|A10〉 − |A12〉+ |A13〉 − |A15〉)]
+|011〉[|γ14〉(|A9〉 + |A11〉+ |A14〉+ |A16〉) + |γ11〉(|A12〉 − |A10〉+ |A13〉 − |A15〉)
+|γ16〉(|A10〉 + |A12〉 − |A13〉 − |A15〉) + |γ17〉(|A11〉 − |A9〉 − |A14〉+ |A16〉)]
−|100〉[|γ15〉(|A9〉 + |A11〉+ |A14〉+ |A16〉) + |γ12〉(|A9〉 − |A11〉+ |A14〉 − |A16〉)
+|γ13〉(|A10〉 + |A12〉 − |A13〉 − |A15〉) + |γ18〉(|A10〉 − |A12〉 − |A13〉+ |A15〉)]
−|101〉[|γ16〉(|A10〉 + |A12〉+ |A13〉+ |A15〉) + |γ11〉(|A12〉 − |A10〉 − |A13〉+ |A15〉)
+|γ14〉(|A9〉 + |A11〉 − |A14〉 − |A16〉) + |γ17〉(|A11〉 − |A9〉+ |A14〉 − |A16〉)]
+|110〉[|γ17〉(|A2〉 + |A4〉+ |A5〉+ |A7〉) + |γ11〉(|A1〉+ |A3〉 − |A6〉 − |A8〉)
+|γ14〉(|A2〉 − |A4〉+ |A5〉 − |A7〉) + |γ16〉(|A1〉 − |A3〉 − |A6〉+ |A8〉)]
+|111〉[|γ18〉(|A1〉 + |A3〉+ |A6〉+ |A8〉) + |γ12〉(|A2〉+ |A4〉 − |A5〉 − |A7〉)
+|γ13〉(|A3〉 − |A1〉 − |A6〉+ |A8〉) + |γ15〉(|A4〉 − |A2〉+ |A5〉 − |A7〉)]}123456A.
(20)
According to Eq. (2), if P1 introduces no error, the following conditions should
be satisfied:
|A1〉 = |A3〉 = |A6〉 = |A8〉,
|A2〉 = |A4〉 = |A5〉 = |A7〉,
|A9〉 = |A11〉 = |A14〉 = |A16〉,
|A10〉 = |A12〉 = |A13〉 = |A5〉. (21)
On the other hand, if P1 measures the particles (1, 2) with the basis {|+〉, |−〉},
then P2 measures the particle 3 with the basis {|+〉, |−〉}, and P2 and P3
measure the particles (4, 5, 6) with the basis {|γ2j 〉|j = 1, 2, . . . , 8}. Then, the
state in Eq. (19) can be rewritten as follows:
1√
8
{|+++〉[|γ21〉(|A2〉 + |A3〉+ |A13〉+ |A16〉) + |γ24〉(|A1〉 − |A4〉+ |A14〉 − |A15〉)
+|γ26〉(|A3〉 − |A2〉+ |A13〉 − |A16〉) + |γ27〉(|A1〉+ |A4〉 − |A14〉 − |A15〉)]
+|++−〉[|γ22〉(|A1〉 + |A4〉+ |A14〉+ |A15〉) + |γ23〉(|A3〉 − |A2〉 − |A13〉+ |A16〉)
+|γ25〉(|A1〉 − |A4〉 − |A14〉+ |A15〉) + |γ28〉(|A2〉+ |A3〉 − |A13〉 − |A15〉)]
+|+−+〉[|γ23〉(|A5〉 + |A8〉+ |A10〉+ |A11〉) + |γ22〉(|A6〉 − |A7〉+ |A9〉 − |A12〉)
+|γ25〉(|A6〉 + |A7〉 − |A9〉 − |A12〉) + |γ28〉(|A8〉 − |A5〉+ |A10〉 − |A11〉)]
+|+−−〉[|γ24〉(|A6〉 + |A7〉+ |A9〉+ |A12〉) + |γ21〉(|A8〉 − |A5〉 − |A10〉+ |A11〉)
+|γ26〉(|A5〉 + |A8〉 − |A10〉 − |A11〉) + |γ27〉(|A6〉 − |A7〉 − |A9〉+ |A12〉)]
+| −++〉[|γ25〉(|A6〉 + |A7〉+ |A9〉+ |A12〉) + |γ22〉(|A6〉 − |A7〉 − |A9〉+ |A12〉)
+|γ23〉(|A5〉 + |A8〉 − |A10〉 − |A11〉) + |γ28〉(|A8〉 − |A5〉 − |A10〉+ |A11〉)]
+| −+−〉[|γ26〉(|A5〉 + |A8〉+ |A10〉+ |A11〉) + |γ21〉(|A8〉 − |A5〉+ |A10〉 − |A11〉)
+|γ24〉(|A6〉 + |A7〉 − |A9〉 − |A12〉) + |γ27〉(|A6〉 − |A7〉+ |A9〉 − |A12〉)]
+| − −+〉[|γ27〉(|A1〉 + |A4〉+ |A14〉+ |A15〉) + |γ21〉(|A2〉+ |A3〉 − |A13〉 − |A16〉)
+|γ24〉(|A1〉 − |A4〉 − |A14〉+ |A15〉) + |γ26〉(|A3〉 − |A2〉+ |A13〉 − |A16〉)]
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+| − −−〉[|γ28〉(|A2〉 + |A3〉+ |A13〉+ |A16〉) + |γ22〉(|A1〉+ |A4〉 − |A14〉 − |A15〉)
+|γ23〉(|A3〉 − |A2〉+ |A13〉 − |A16〉) + |γ25〉(|A1〉 − |A4〉+ |A14〉 − |A15〉)]}123456A.
(22)
According to Eq. (8), if P1 introduces no error, the following conditions should
be satisfied:
|A1〉 = |A4〉 = |A14〉 = |A15〉,
|A2〉 = |A3〉 = |A13〉 = |A16〉,
|A5〉 = |A8〉 = |A10〉 = |A11〉,
|A6〉 = |A7〉 = |A9〉 = |A12〉. (23)
We can derive from Eq. (21) and Eq. (23) that |A1〉 = |A2〉 = . . . = |A16〉,
which means that the state Ψ6qb and the prob state prepared by P1 are entirely
not entangled. Thus the subsequent measurement outcome of the prob state
tells P1 nothing.
P1 may use the similar attack as P2 to derive the inputs of P2 and P3 in
accordance with the cipertexts C2 and C3 that are M2 and M3 encoded with
K2 and K3, respectively. However, according to the Eq. (15) and the encoding
arrangement Eq. (16), he can have K1⊕K2⊕K3 = 0 but the keys K2 and K3
and therefore is unable to stealM2 and M3 offered by P2 and P3, respectively.
So the protocol remains secure against this attack.
In the step (S5) of our protocol, P1 first determines whether M2 = M3
using his own key K1, P2 (P3) then determines if M1 =M3 (M1 =M2) or not
based on his key K2 (K3) and at last they can get the comparison result. In
fact, the order in which one participant decides whether or not the other two
participants’ private inputs are equal is not important because their private
inputs are encrypted by their keys that are kept secret.
Unfortunately, any two participants can collude with each other to derive
the third one’s key according toK1⊕K2⊕K3 = 0, obtaining the corresponding
private input. So it would be interesting to design multi-party quantum private
comparison protocols that are still secure against such an attack.
4.2.3 Security analysis over lossy and noise channel
In the above analysis, the quantum channels are assumed to be under the ideal
condition (i.e. noiseless and lossless). But quantum channels are usually lossy
and noisy in the real world. In this section, we show that our protocol remains
secure in lossy and noisy quantum channels. The eavesdropper, Eve, is assumed
to be powerful enough to establish an ideal channel with any participant. We
discuss the lossy and noisy quantum channels in case as follows.
Case 1. Lossy quantum channel
In such a quantum channel, Eve may intercepts particles sent from P1 to
P2 and P3. She then keeps some of them and transmits the other particles to
P2 and P3 through an ideal channel. If the intercepted particles are not decoy
particles, she is able to performmeasurements on the related particles with Bell
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basis. The measurement results will lead to the leakage of the some key bits for
P1, she will finally get some information of P1’s private input. Fortunately, our
protocol remains secure against such a attack. In the Step 2 of our protocol, P2
(P3) informs P1 which particles have been received and which are lost during
the transmission. P1 and P2 (P3) only employ the received particles to make
a public discussion and finish equality comparison. The intercepted particles
are useless and Eve will fail to extract any information about P1’s key that is
used to encrypt his private input.
Case 2. Noisy quantum channel
Eve can intercept the particles sent from P1 to P2 (P3), performing intercept-
resend attack or entangle-measure attack, forwarding these tampered particles
to P2 (P3) through an idea channel established by herself. In this situation,
Eve tries her best to cover up the tampering of particles as the noise existed
on the quantum channel between P1 and P2 (P3). We have learned that these
attacks will be caught if the eavesdropper detection rate of our protocol is
smaller than the quantum bit error rate of noise (QBER). In accordance with
[54,55,56], the QBER is roughly between 2% and 8.9% depending on the dif-
ferent channel situations (e.g., distance, etc.). Fortunately, the detection rate
for decoy particle in our protocol is 25% that is greater than the error rate
of the quantum channel. Therefore, our protocol is also secure in the noisy
quantum channel.
Up until now, we have completed the analysis of the correctness and the
security of our protocol.
Note that if Lin et al.’s protocol [41] is used for three participants’ private
comparison, it needs run twice in the worst case. But our protocol needs run
only once even in the worst case. For Chang et al.’s protocol [39], in the case of
the number of the participants is 3, our protocol needs more 6δ particles than
their protocol do and our protocol will suffer collusion attack as mentioned
in the previous security analysis. This is the disadvantages of our protocol!
However, such disadvantages happen because of the lack of an external third
party. The more 6δ particles serves as participant attack detection, because
the initial quantum states are prepared by P1. We need to check if he is honest.
If we include the external third party who is assumed to be semi-honest and
prepares the initial quantum state, these defects will vanish. But it will require
more various quantum states and different quantum operations. Chang et al.’s
protocol may not be able to finish the private task if it lacks the semi-honest
third party. In practice, resorting to an external third party for help in quan-
tum private comparison may unexpectedly result in some private information
leakage and this help is usually not free. In this sense, designing quantum
private comparison protocols without an external third party is necessary.
5 Conclusions
We present a new three-party quantum private comparison protocol based on
genuinely maximally entangled six-qubit states. Three participants can deter-
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mine whether their private information are equal without the assistance of an
external third party and in the meantime keep their inputs secret, respectively.
The proposed protocol does not require any unitary operations to encode infor-
mation for the sake of the excellent properties of genuinely maximally entan-
gled six-qubit states. Because the proposed protocol utilizes one-step quantum
transmission, it can be prevented from Trojan horse attacks. Finally, we also
analyze the correctness and security of our protocol.
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